

3. A high position who publicly assaulted his wife and threw her clothing on the lawn, shrubbery and street. The information was obtained from the personnel record by a "progressive" security officer who said such details of a public family fight had nothing to do with security or suitability of a high public official.

7. A man dismissed as a security risk by the Mutual Security Agency and characterized as having "a rotten file" who was appointed to a State Department position and given full security clearance.

8. A foreign service officer stationed in Mexico and Caracas, Venezuela, who was guilty of a series of incidents of sexual misconduct, including an affair with the wife of the ambassador of another nation. His conduct was excused by State Department politicians.

9. A security officer who withheld information from his superiors concerning the loss of classified documents by an American ambassador. The officer was not censured and was promoted to be a top lieutenant of Reilly.

10. A security officer stationed in Moscow who permitted himself to be enticed into the apartment of a Russian woman, an agent for the secret police. The secret police used concealed cameras to photograph the American and his nude companion and tried to get him to spy for the Soviet Union. He never was criticized or disciplined.

11. A foreign service officer who admitted to security officers and State Department medical authorities that he had engaged in homosexual acts. The medical officers found him unfit to serve abroad because in their judgment his homosexual tendencies made him a potential security risk. He was sent abroad, however, and was assigned to a critical post behind the Iron Curtain.

12. A foreign service officer who, on his application form and in interviews, concealed the fact that he had been a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist party. He was not disciplined and still is employed in the State Department.

13. A foreign service officer stationed in an eastern European post who admitted homosexual tendencies and other personal misconduct but who was given responsibility for supervising the Marine guard personnel and protecting all safe combinations at the American embassy. His negligence permitted foreign agents to have access to classified reports at the embassy. He was not disciplined and received normal promotions. He still is in the State Department.

14. A foreign service officer, formerly a security officer, who owned two automobiles but was authorized to have only one shipped to a new post at government expense. He had the second automobile concealed in a lift van and represented it on the invoice as a household furnishing. His case was referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution for fraud, but there was no prosecution and he was not disciplined.

The crucial importance of having a first-rate security program has been driven home by the London *Sunday Times*' sensational new disclosures concerning Harold Philby, the head of the Soviet section of the British Secret Intelligence Service who fled to Moscow in 1963.

Philby's achievement in rising to this position while himself being a Soviet agent, says the *Times*, ranks as one of the greatest espionage coups of all time.

Philby later went on to become the linkman between the British service and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, from which position he could give his Soviet spymasters thorough knowledge of the operations of both the major Western intelligence agencies.

Remarkd the *Sunday Times* last week: "... there is a classic quality about the earlier achievement. The selection in 1944 of Philby, already a Soviet agent of more than 10 years' standing, as the man to conceive, build and control a new British operation against the Russians, is an event embodying the purest essence of espionage."

In its investigation into the Philby conspiracy, the *Sunday Times* also unearthed a remarkable 1956 U.S. State Department report on British diplomat Donald Maclean, who fled to Moscow in 1951.

The 1956 report, says the *Sunday Times*, "makes it clear that, contrary to repeated British government assertions since 1951, Donald Maclean had access to every crucial Anglo-American policy decision at the height of the Cold War. . . .

"... the U.S. intelligence report reveals that Maclean had knowledge of secret Anglo-American exchanges on the North Atlantic pact, the Korean War and the Japanese peace treaty.

"It also shows, for instance, that Maclean had full knowledge of the critical American determination to 'localize the conflict,' and therefore of its decision not to allow the United Nations forces under Gen. MacArthur to carry the war against the Chinese coast.

"Both MacArthur and his chief of intelligence, Gen. Charles Willoughby, were certain at the time that this information had been passed to the Russians. Just before he died, MacArthur complained that the Chinese not only knew of this policy decision, but 'all our strategic troop movements.'"

The first secretary in the British Embassy in Washington and later head of the American department in the Foreign Office, Maclean also passed on vital information to the Soviet regarding our atomic secrets.

OCT 21 1967
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